Emerging Patterns of Power in Post-Taliban Afghanistan

On December 6, near Bonn, Germany, two major and two relatively minor Afghan factions agreed on the formation of an Interim Administration (IA) to govern the country in its initial post-Taliban phase. The Bonn Agreement, reached under UN auspices, specifies three significant stages in attempting to re-establish Afghanistan as a unified and--hopefully--peaceful nation state.

Firstly, that the IA should assume authority in Kabul on December 22, 2001, simultaneously taking over the country's seat at the United Nations, a position currently held in a caretaker capacity by the former government of Burhanuddin Rabbani (1992-1996).

Secondly, that a Special Commission should be established to prepare a loya jirga, or gathering of tribal elders and leading politicians to be held in six months time. This gathering will select a transitional head of state and seek to establish a broad-based, Interim Government (IG) to administer the country for a period not exceeding two years, during which time preparations will be made for nation-wide elections. It is expected that Muhammad Zahir Shah, the former king of Afghanistan now in exile in Rome, will preside over this commission.

Thirdly, that no longer than 18 months after the IG assumes power, a second loya jirga will be held to draw up a new constitution, until which time the 1964 constitution implemented by the former king will be reinstated. The IG will also seek to establish, through consensus, a central bank, supreme court and other essential institutions necessary for the rebuilding of the Afghan polity.

The Interim Administration

The Bonn Agreement named Hamid Karzai, a prominent Pashtun leader and relative of the former king, as Chairman of the IA. The 30-strong cabinet, which has been carefully selected to reflect the country's diverse ethnic background, includes eleven Pashtun, eight Tajiks, five Hazara, three Uzbeks and three members of other unspecified minority groups.

Of the four groups represented at Bonn, the Northern Alliance has emerged as the dominant force with no fewer than 17 seats. These include three key portfolios: Defence (Mohammed Fahim, Tajik); Foreign Affairs (Dr Abdullah Abdullah, Tajik); and Interior (Younis Qanooni, Tajik).

The most powerful faction after the Northern Alliance is the Rome Group, which holds 8 seats including the key portfolios of IA Chairman (Hamid Karzai, Pashtun) and Finance (Hedayat Amin Arsala, Pashtun). Supporters of former King Muhammad Zahir Shah, this group enjoys widespread support amongst the powerful ethnic Pashtun community.

Two smaller factions, the Cyprus Group (backed by Iran) and the Peshawar Group (backed by Pakistan) are also represented in the Interim Administration with the minor portfolios for--respectively--Irrigation and Transport.

In a move clearly designed to broaden the gender, as well as ethnic base of post-Taliban Afghanistan, two women have been included in the IA. They are Sima Simar, a Hazara member of the Rome Group who has been given the portfolio for Women's Affairs, and Suhaila Seddiqi, a widely-respected but unaffiliated Tajik surgeon, who holds the portfolio for Public Health.

Ethnic Rivalries

Under the Bonn Agreement a major effort has clearly been made to bring together as many feuding ethnic and religious factions as possible. The question is, can it work?

To the south and east of the Hindu Kush, dominating the capital Kabul and major cities like Jalalabad, Khost and Kandahar, live the Pashtun. This major group numbers about 6.5 million within Afghanistan, while a similar number live across the frontier in Pakistan. Almost exclusively Sunni Muslims, they speak various Pashto dialects. Pashtuns form around 50-55% of the population of Afghanistan, and have long been its traditional rulers.

Ahmad Shah Durrani, the founder of modern Afghanistan in the mid-18th century, was a Pashtun. So is Mohammed Zahir Shah, the former king ousted in 1973. So were virtually all the Taliban, including their fugitive leader Mullah Muhammad Omar. Under the IA it seems clear that most Pashtuns will remain suspicious of Northern Alliance ministers and put their trust in the IA Chairman Hamid Karzai and the Rome Group, as well as--by extension--the former king.

The most powerful group within the Northern Alliance are the Tajiks, numbering around 3.5 million in Afghanistan and dominating the mountainous northeast of the country, especially Badakshan Province. Mostly speakers of Dari, a language related to Persian, they are nearly all Sunni Muslims, though there are a small number of "Mountain Tajiks" in the remote Pamir region who are Ismaili Shia--that is, followers of the Aga Khan.

Under the IA the Tajiks are well represented by Defence Minister Mohammed Fahim, Foreign Affairs Minister Dr Abdullah Abdullah, and Interior Minister Younis Qanooni. All three belong to the Tajik-dominated Jamiat-e-Islami party of Burhanuddin Rabbani. It has also been suggested that former president Rabbani (who, notably, has not been given a post in the IA) may be appointed Head of a future Supreme Court under the proposed IG in six months time.

Immediately to the west of the Tajik heartland, centring on the dusty plains around the city of Mazar-i-Sharif, live the Northern Alliance's second largest contingent, the Uzbeks. This Turkic people, numbering around one million within Afghanistan, are uniformly Sunni Muslims with strong links to neighbouring Uzbekistan. Their strongman, Abdul Rashid Dostum, heads the Uzbek-dominated Jombesh-e-Melli Islami or National Islamic Party, and has a reputation both for brutality and as a political chameleon. To date he has shown little enthusiasm for the consensus reached in Bonn, and has not been given (or perhaps has not yet accepted) a post in the IA.

The third constituent in the disparate group that make up the Northern Alliance are the Hazara, a predominantly Mongol people numbering around 900,000 who inhabit the central Hindu Kush, especially the area known as Hazarajat centred on the remote town of Chakcharan. Amongst the poorest people in Afghanistan, the Hazara speak a dialect of Dari and are nearly all Shia Muslims. This brought them into particularly bitter conflict with the Sunni ideologues of Taliban, and some of the hardest fighting of recent years was around the largely Hazara settlement of Bamiyan--until last February home to the largest standing Buddha figures in the world.

The Hazara strongman, and head of the Hazara-dominated Hezb-i-Wahdat or Unity Party, is Karim Khalili. He draws much backing from his fellow Shia in Iran, and mistrusts his Tajik and Uzbek allies almost as much as he does the Pashtuns. Like the Uzbek leader, Abdul Rashid Dostum, he has not been given (or perhaps has not yet accepted) a post in the IA.

There are numerous other ethnic groups in Afghanistan--notably the Turkmen and Kyrgyz of the north, the Baluch of the southwest, and the Nuristanis of the east. None have any serious military or political clout, however, and none are likely to attain serious representation in the IA--or in any future Afghan government, for that matter.

All of which means that both the IA and the government designated to succeed it are likely to be dominated by Pashtuns and Tajiks together with a number of largely symbolic lesser posts given to smaller (but still significant) minorities such as the Uzbeks and the Hazara. The good news is that, following the Bonn Conference, power amongst both the Pashtun and Tajik communities has passed to younger, more sophisticated, and apparently more enlightened leaderships.

Certainly it would be hard to imagine a less sophisticated group than the Taliban, so widely despised for their provincial origins and narrow-minded interpretation of Islam that that they were mockingly (but discreetly) referred to as "the donkey boys" by the Kabul intelligentsia.

The Tajiks

Younis Qanooni: The leader of the Northern Alliance delegation at the Bonn Conference, Qanooni was Deputy Defence Minister in Burhanuddin Rabbani's government during the 1990s. Born in 1957, he was a close friend of the Northern Alliance military commander Ahmad Shah Massoud--the so-called "Lion of the Panjshir" assassinated by supposed Al-Qaeda suicide bombers on September 9, two days before the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon. A moderate known both for his willingness to compromise and his intelligence, he is said to have impressed international diplomats at Bonn with his negotiating skills.

Abdullah Abdullah: A close ally of Younis Qanooni and also a good friend of the assassinated Ahmad Shah Massoud, Abdullah emerged as the chief Northern Alliance spokesman and is likely to play a similar role in the IA. A consummate and articulate politician, he speaks several languages including fluent English and is a qualified medical doctor.

Mohammed Fahim: The third of the triumvirate of younger Tajik leaders, Fahim is close to both Qanooni and Abdullah. A military man, he replaced Ahmad Shah Massoud when the latter was assassinated, and is now commander of what is certainly the strongest militia in the Northern Alliance, and probably in the whole country.

All three of the younger "reformist" Tajiks seem less rigid and more willing to compromise than their elderly mentor, Burhanuddin Rabbani, who has effectively been sidelined. Certainly they are more aware of international opinion, and more readily cognisant of the need for compromise with the numerically dominant Pashtun--all of which may, perhaps, bode well for emergence of a government of national unity.

The Pashtuns

Hamid Karzai: Head of Afghanistan's influential Popolzai tribe, Karzai is a distant relative of the former king respected by most Pashtun elders, yet he is also well educated and Westernised. He speaks English fluently and appreciates the importance of compromise with other groups--notably the Northern Alliance--in Afghanistan. Although initially a supporter of Taliban, he quickly turned against the movement because of its un-Afghan interpretation of Islam and the growing influence of Arab mujahiddin, especially Al-Qaeda, on his country. A moderate, he is currently the best hope for building a new and more moderate power base for the Pashtuns in Afghanistan.

Mohammad Zahir Shah: Now an elderly exile, the former king still retains widespread affection amongst the Pashtuns and indeed many other peoples in Afghanistan. He is expected to return to Kabul not as king, but to facilitate the establishment of a loya jirga in June or July 2002 at which--amongst other issues--the future status of the monarchy may be decided. He has called for the creation of a broad-based government of national unity.

The Wild Cards

Ismail Khan: This Tajik warrior liberated the western Afghan city of Herat from the communists and became its governor before being overthrown and locked up by the Taliban. Now he is back in Herat at the head of a predominantly Tajik militia, enjoying considerable support from nearby Iran. Although nominally allied with the Northern Alliance, he is very much his own man and will doubtless require a position within the IA, or at least the IG, if he is to remain on side.

Karim Khalili: Hazara chieftain and head of the Hezb-i-Wahdat, Khalili and his tribal followers are based in the central Hindu Kush but enjoy a considerable following in both Mazar-i-Sharif and Kabul. The Hazara, long excluded from power and treated with disdain by both Pashtuns and Tajiks, are quite strong enough to make trouble if they are ignored by the new authorities. As Shia Muslims they enjoy considerable backing from Iran, a factor the IA will ignore at its peril.

Abdul Rashid Dostum: Although still affiliated with the Northern Alliance, this vicious and unprincipled warlord is chiefly interested in maintaining power in Mazar-i-Sharif and the surrounding Uzbek (and Turkmen) provinces of northern Afghanistan where he is known as the "little pasha". Apparently enjoying some external support from Turkey, his position may be at least temporarily secured if Ankara contributes substantially to an international peace-keeping force. He has the potential to be a serious threat both to national unity and to the IA.

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar: The Pashtun equivalent of General Dostum, this religious zealot is presently in exile in Iran, where he is--or perhaps was--valued for his opposition to allied coalition (and especially US-UK) intervention against Al-Qaeda and Taliban. Infamous both for throwing acid in the faces of women wearing make up and for the shelling of Kabul during the Rabbani administration which resulted in thousands of deaths, it would be best for the IA and for future Afghan stability if he remains in exile.

Immediate Agendas

All of the factions will now look to the task of defining Afghanistan's future political arrangements. Neither the Pashtun or Tajik groups will favour allowing significant local autonomy for minorities within this system. The younger leaderships of Karzai and the Tajik triumvirate seem genuinely to want to establish a broad-based government.

Others, especially Dostum but also Khalili, are much more interested in protecting fiefdoms--a stance that the main parties to the IA/IG are likely to view as the path to continuing instability. Dostum can be expected to try to maintain his fiefdom of six provinces and up to 4 million people, possibly leading to fighting. If Dostum were to break with the Northern Alliance, there might emerge a politico-military alliance between Karzai and the Tajik triumvirate that could provide for future stability.

Ultimately, whoever enjoys the support of the US will receive sufficient military and financial largesse to ensure they retain and strengthen their hold on power. Provided the anti-terrorist alliance holds to its promise to supply wide-ranging support to the IA/IG, all the important cards should be in the hands of Karzai and the Tajik triumvirate.

This article was originally published in Strategic Comments, the analytical journal of the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

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